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Abstract
Increasing access to contraception has the potential to empower women and improve the economic standing
of families across the globe. Many researchers have explored the impacts of contraception on families and the
determinants of women’s level of empowerment, but little scholarship exists on their direct relationship. This
paper explores the impacts of contraceptive use on women’s empowerment, measured by a sum of women’s
household decision-making agency. Panel data from three rounds of the Indonesian Family Life Survey is used
to run multiple regressions with household fixed effects. Results suggest that women who use contraception
have input on two additional types of household decisions, compared to women who do not use
contraception. Therefore, women who use contraception have greater decision-making agency. Though
additional research is necessary to prove causation and further understand this relationship, these preliminary
findings support that use of contraception increases women's decision-making agency in their households.
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Introduction  
Women in every nation face gender inequality, which limits their ability to 
contribute to the world economy and create greater opportunities for themselves 
and their children. Levels of inequality vary across nations, tending to be lower in 
developed nations. The Gender Inequality Index published by the United Nations 
Development Programme provides estimations of inequality, where a value of 1 
represents perfect inequality, and a value of 0 represents perfect equality. The 
most equal country in 2017 was Switzerland, with a value of 0.039. Yemen had 
the greatest inequality, with a value of 0.839. The average value for the 158 
nations included was 0.347 (United Nations Development Programme, 2018). 
These statistics affirm that great strides remain to be made in women’s equality 
and empowerment.  
Empowering women is crucial to promoting economic development and 
alleviating poverty. Women’s empowerment is defined by the European Institute 
for Gender Equality using five components: “women’s sense of self-worth; their 
right to have and to determine choices; their right to have access to opportunities 
and resources; their right to have power to control their own lives, both within and 
outside the home; and their ability to influence the direction of social change to 
create a more just social and economic order, nationally and internationally” 
(European Institute for Gender Equality, 2002). A common measure of women’s 
empowerment in economic research is women’s decision-making agency, or the 
level of input women have on household decision-making processes. This is 
consistent with the definition of women’s empowerment, as it measures choices, 
access to opportunities and resources, and influence. Research suggests that 
increases in women’s decision-making agency supports long term economic 
growth because when women are more empowered, families spend more on 
nutritional foods and education-related expenditures (Pangaribowo, Tsegai, & 
Sukamdi, 2018), which increases the likelihood of children earning higher 
incomes than their parents in the future (Pohan, 2013).  
This study focuses on the determinants of women’s decision-making 
agency in Indonesia, a nation with a gender inequality index of 0.580 in the year 
2017 (United Nations Development Programme, 2018). Many governments have 
created programs to promote female empowerment. Arguably, Indonesia has been 
one of the most progressive countries in terms of promoting women’s equality 
over the past several decades. In partnership with UN Women, the Indonesian 
government promotes women’s empowerment by allocating funds to end violence 
against women, maintain peace, build social cohesion, and promote women’s 
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 rights through legislation (UN Women, 2019). Other government programs 
promote the use of contraception, because contraception allows women to plan 
their families and decrease family size, delay childbirth and instead pursue further 
education or career advancement, and allocate time to other productive activities. 
Smaller family size also means more opportunities to enter the workforce and 
decreased spending on costs associated with child rearing.  
The Indonesian government first committed to a national family planning 
initiative in 1969, with goals of expanding access to contraception, decreasing 
fertility rates, and promoting gender equality. This initiative focused on equipping 
local health clinics with birth control and information on family planning, and 
employing fieldworkers to advocate birth control door-to-door in villages (Hull, 
Hull, & Singarimbun, 1977). As a result of these programs, contraceptive 
prevalence rates increased from 8.6% in 1973 to 53.1% in 1993 (World Bank, 
2019). These rates are reported for any contraceptive method among women 
between the ages of 15 and 49, and are available in Figure 1 below. In the same 
time period, average fertility rate dropped from 5.6 to 2.8 children per woman 
(World Bank, 2019). After the late 1990s, these rates stagnated, leaving unmet 
demand for contraception. In 2012 at the London Summit on Family Planning, the 
Indonesian government announced a new commitment to family planning 
initiatives, known as Family Planning 2020, with an overarching goal of 
“strengthening the integrated approach for rights-based family planning 
programming at the sub-national level” (Family Planning 2020, n.d.). This 
program aims to support health equity by providing information and access to 
contraception to all women, and achieve an average fertility rate of 2.1 children 
per woman by 2025 (Putjuk, 2014), compared to the 2.4 in 2016 (World Bank, 
2019). As these efforts continue, barriers to the expansion of contraception 
include fear of side effects of modern hormonal methods and preference for 
traditional methods, such as herbs, massage, and long periods of abstinence (Hull, 
Hull, & Singarimbun, 1977), as well as access to health care facilities and costs of 
contraception (Putjuk, 2014).  
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 Figure 1 
 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether Indonesian women’s 
use of contraception has a causal effect on their empowerment. Empowerment is 
measured using women’s decision-making agency in the household. Regressions 
are used to determine the impact of use of contraception on decision-making 
agency. This study uses the hypothesis that the use of contraception, especially 
modern methods, will increase women’s decision-making agency. This research 
will focus on the Republic of Indonesia, the fourth most populous country in the 
world, and the largest Muslim nation. This nation has great potential for economic 
development and industrial growth, as 62% of the population lives on less than 
$5.50 a day (Central Intelligence Agency, 2018). The increases in contraceptive 
prevalence evident in Figure 1 also position Indonesia as an interesting nation for 
this research. Increases in contraceptive use represent a generational shift that is 
evident in the data. These factors make Indonesia a great candidate to explore the 
relationship between use of contraception and decision-making agency.  
The data on use of contraception and decision-making authority come 
from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS). This survey has been used for 
research in public health, education, economics, and other disciplines. The IFLS 
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 includes questions on household decision-making structures that can be used to 
estimate women’s decision-making agency. Decision-making agency in the 
household can be used to estimate women’s empowerment, based on women’s 
involvement in decisions that affect their lives and the lives of their family 
members. Past research has explored this measure and its determinants. This 
research will add to the existing body of knowledge by using panel data to 
observe changes in women’s decision-making agency over time and exploring the 
direct relationship between contraception and women’s decision-making agency.  
 
Literature Review 
Decision-making agency is used across disciplines as a measure of 
women’s empowerment. Agency is used to estimate empowerment because it 
measures degree of control over resources, the power to make decisions about 
one’s life and family, and to some degree, self-confidence (Pradhan, 2003). 
Decision-making agency has been used as a measure of women’s empowerment 
by researchers studying poverty reduction (Alkire, 2005), policy-making 
(Mosedale, 2005), and other topics.  
Many researchers have explored women’s decision-making agency and 
use of contraception using the IFLS and other sources, but not their direct 
relationship. Prior researchers have identified factors that influence and determine 
women’s decision-making agency in the home. A 2015 study of women in 
Bangladesh found that the following characteristics had significant impacts on 
women’s role in decision-making: education, age, rural or urban location, 
marriage status, participation in volunteer groups, exposure to media and 
television, and having at least one son (Jahan, Hossain, & Farhad, 2015). Sultana 
Alam (2011) reports that women's educational attainment, participation in the labor 
force, and income were positively associated with their decision-making agency. 
Another paper from Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg (1999) suggests that 
when women own more assets at the time of marriage, compared to assets owned 
by men, they will yield more decision-making agency, using the IFLS. A 2010 
study using the Nepal Demographic Health Survey found decision-making agency 
to be positively associated with age, employment, education, and number of living 
children, and negatively associated with living in rural areas (Acharya, et. al. 
2010). Women’s decision-making agency has also been found to increase when 
women access credit through a group borrowing model. A 2005 paper found that 
when women are members of a borrowing group, they gain input on household 
decisions (Holvoet, 2005). This suggests that women’s decision-making agency in 
the home can change during their adult life based on experiences.  
Increased decision-making agency held by women is beneficial for 
economic development and public health, as demonstrated by research using the 
IFLS. Recently, Pangaribowo, Tsegai, and Sukamdi (2018) studied women’s 
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 bargaining power and household expenditure. The researchers found that when 
women own a larger share of assets, household spending on temptation goods 
(such as tobacco and alcohol) decreases, and spending on nutritious foods and 
other family expenditures increases. Additionally, researchers reported that when 
women participate in community-based organizations their families allocate less 
to staple foods and adult goods. Pohan (2013) presents evidence that increased 
spending on education will increase educational achievement for impoverished 
people and allow them to rise into higher income brackets in the short-term and 
long-term. This may be related to increases in women’s decision-making agency 
because as Pangaribowo, Tsegai, and Sukamdi (2018) found, women are more 
likely to allocate funds to family expenditures. Research from Ethiopia also 
suggests that households where women have less decision-making agency have 
higher rates of child mortality (Fantahun, et. al., 2007). Research demonstrates 
that when women have greater decision-making agency, their families benefit.  
The Center for Global Development cites access to contraception as a key 
factor in women’s economic empowerment (Glassman, 2017). Research from the 
International Center for Research on Women suggests that increased 
contraceptive prevalence increases the educational attainment of daughters and 
promotes equity in marital partnerships (Stoebenau & Malhotra, 2011). This paper 
assumes the hypothesis that decision-making agency is positively affected by the 
use of contraception. Contraception allows women to plan their pregnancies and 
delay childbirth, providing the opportunity to complete additional years of 
schooling or to work outside the home (Bailey, 2006). Limiting the number of 
children born to a woman also decreases the amount of time that must be 
allocated to household work. Contraception grants women further control over 
their bodies and their lives, and has been cited as a cause of women’s 
empowerment in many nations. With different responsibilities, and the 
opportunity to hold roles other than caretaker and mother, women may become 
more empowered, and gain decision-making agency.  
 
Theory 
 
Theoretically, the use of contraception affects women’s decision-making 
by changing incentives and rewards within intra-household bargaining. This can 
be thought of as a two-player non-cooperative game. This theory assumes a 
traditional husband and wife who bargain to make decisions. If they both 
cooperate, they share decision-making equally. Alternatively, one can “cheat” by 
unilaterally making more decisions. Ultimately, the decision to cheat by the 
husband is dependent on the husband’s expectation that they wife will be better-
off cooperating (allowing him to cheat) rather than to cheat herself. If both choose 
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 a non-cooperative strategy, then the household is worse off as the two struggle 
over decision-making power.  
What role does contraception play in this bargain? The use of 
contraception allows women to delay childbirth, allowing them to allocate more 
time to pursuing further education and gaining work experience. Greater 
experience and education leads to increased incomes and greater independence. 
With greater income and experience, women may gain bargaining power in 
marital relationships because it is more feasible that they would be better off not 
cooperating. Therefore, they represent a more “credible threat”. Specifically, 
women with decision-making power are more able to leave their husband or 
demand power if they are educated and have income. Women without decision-
making agency are expected to cooperate with their husbands and accept 
decisions made by him. Past research has established this theory, known as the 
divorce-threat bargaining model (Lundberg & Pollack, 1994). Men may be more 
inclined to cooperate when women are more empowered, or have more 
experience in the labor force, in order to maintain a stable household. Figure 2 
offers a game theory matrix explaining this concept, where utilities are reported 
for husbands and wives based on whether they choose to cooperate when making 
household decisions. The variable “U” represents utility for males and females for 
each possible outcome.  
 
Figure 2 
Game Theory Matrix 
 Female (F) 
Not Cooperate Cooperate 
Male (M) Not Cooperate UM3, U
F
3 U
M
2, U
F
2 
Cooperate UM4, U
F
4 U
M
1, U
F
1 
 
Based on this theory, a husband will choose to “cheat”, or not cooperate if 
the following two assumptions are true: 1) UM2 is greater than U
M
1 and 2) U
F
2 is 
greater than UF3. However, if U
F
3 is a function of contraception, and increases 
when contraception is used, the second assumption may not hold true. This would 
lead men to choose to cooperate instead, therefore sharing decision-making power 
with their spouse. If use of contraception increases women’s bargaining power in 
the household and incentivizes men to cooperate on household decisions, 
women’s decision-making agency will increase. 
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 Data & Model 
The data used in this study was collected through the IFLS, a longitudinal 
survey comprised of over 30,000 individuals. It is representative of 83% of the 
Indonesian population. Topics include health, personal finance, community assets, 
access to healthcare, and demographics. Five waves of the survey have been 
conducted between 1993 and 2015. This study uses data from the second, third, 
and fourth rounds of the IFLS. These studies are labeled as IFLS2, IFLS3, and 
IFLS4, and were conducted in the years 1997, 2000, and 2007, respectively. Data 
was collected through interviews with members of each participating household, 
as well as interviews with community leaders. The interviews were conducted in 
the native language of respondents, and the translated results are available online. 
The dataset used in this study was constructed by identifying all of the women in 
the sample who identified as the head of their household or the spouse of the head 
of household. Women who moved to a different community between 1997 and 
2007 are excluded to avoid confounding from changes in access to healthcare and 
environment.  
This dataset includes 11,042 observations, representing women ranging 
from ages 19 to 97. Summary statistics for the dataset are available in Table A1 in 
the Appendix. The sample used in all regressions excludes women who were over 
the age of 50, to account for menopause decreasing the demand for contraception. 
This cutoff is consistent with internationally accepted measures, as the World 
Bank uses women between the ages of 15 and 49 when reporting on fertility 
indicators. This sample includes 6,663 observations over the three rounds, 
representing over 2,000 women across the three survey waves. Each woman is 
identified numerically by a personal ID, a household ID, and a community ID 
number. Summary statistics for this sample are available in Table 1. 
To explore the relationship between use of contraception and decision-
making agency, three regression models are estimated. The dependent variable is 
a sum of women’s decision-making agency. The independent variables tested are 
contraceptive use, each woman’s age in 1997, number of dependents in the 
household, total number of household members, and the natural log of per capita 
expenditure in the household. The use of panel data allows the equation to 
account for the effects on individual women over time, and changes after 
contraception is introduced. Using fixed effects controls for the impacts of factors 
that do not change over the course of the study, including religion, community 
environment, level of education (of women and their husbands), and personality 
traits of women. Other researchers have used additional variables, such as 
educational attainment and rural or urban location, in studies on women’s 
empowerment. However, the use of fixed effects allows for the isolation of such 
variables and controls for unobserved factors on the individual and community 
levels. Therefore, the effects of factors such as a woman’s desire to be 
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 independent, her likelihood to desire greater household decision-making agency, 
and her general personality will be limited. 
The model given in equation (1) is designed to estimate women’s 
decision-making agency in the household based on contraceptive use, age, 
number of dependents, household size, and per capita expenditure. This model is 
used to estimate three regressions, as well as sensitivity test. The model also 
includes household fixed effects, Ѳi, and an error term to explain additional 
variance. In the model, “i” represents each woman, “j” represents each 
community, and “t” represents the year.  
 
Equation (1): 
Decision-Making Agencyijt = β0 + β1(Use of any contraceptive)ijt  
+ β2(Age of respondent)ijt  
+ β3(Number of dependents)ijt  
+ β4(Household size, number of people)ijt  
+ β5(Household expenditure per capita)ijt  
+ Ѳi  + ɛijt 
 
The independent variable is defined as a sum of women’s household 
decision-making agency. The IFLS survey asks women who makes decisions 
about various expenditures in the household, and respondents list all individuals 
who have input on each of the following sixteen types of decisions. Decision-
makers may include the head of household, spouses, parents, siblings, and others. 
These individual decisions are: 
 
a) choice of food eaten at home; 
b) routine purchases for household items such as cleaning supplies; 
c) your clothes; 
d) your spouse’s clothes; 
e) your children’s clothes; 
f) your children’s education; 
g) your children’s health; 
h) large expensive purchases for the household; 
i) giving money to your family; 
j) giving money to your spouse’s family; 
k) gifts for parties/weddings; 
l) money for monthly arisan (savings lottery); 
m) money for monthly savings; 
n) time the husband spends socializing; 
o) time the wife spends socializing; and 
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 p) whether you and your spouse work. 
 
 To create a decision sum, values are assigned to each response, and a sum 
is calculated for each woman. When a woman is the sole person responsible for 
any of the above decisions, her decision sum increases by 1 point. When a woman 
shares any of the above decisions with her husband and no additional family 
members, her decision sum increases by 0.5 points. Therefore, an increase from 0 
to 0.5 in this variable can be interpreted as a woman gaining shared decision-
making agency on one additional household decision. When a woman has no 
input on a single decision, or share decision-making agency for that decision with 
two or more additional household members, she is assigned a value of 0 for that 
decision. The sum of each of these values creates the woman’s decision-making 
agency sum, with a maximum possible score of 16. The dataset also includes a 
question asking who makes decisions about use of contraception. This question is 
excluded from the analysis to avoid reverse causality and isolate the effects of 
contraception on decision-making agency. 
Summary statistics for decision-making agency are reported for the dataset 
in Table A1, for the sample in Table 1, and for each wave in Table A3. 
Histograms for decision-making sum are available in Figure 3. The average 
decision sum for women of all ages in the first wave is 6.4, with a max of 16 and 
over 40% of women with a score of 0. For the second wave, the average decision 
sum is 6.6, with a max of 16 and over 40% of women with a score of 0. In the 
third wave, the average decision sum is 5.9, with a max of 16 and over 50% of 
women with a score of 0. When only women under the age of 50 are considered, 
the decision sum values increase, suggesting that younger generations are more 
empowered. The average values in each wave for this sample are 7.5, 7.5, and 7.3, 
with maximum values of 15.5, 16, and 16. For women between the ages of 19 and 
49, a significantly smaller proportion of women have a decision sum of 0, 
representing less than 25% of women in all three waves of the survey.   
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 Figure 3 
Decision-Making Agency Histograms 
 
 Histograms: Dataset Histograms: Sample (Age<50) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
IFLS2 
Year: 1997 
 
All Women: 
μ: 6.443 
σ: 3.784 
 
Age <50: 
x̅: 7.490 
σ: 3.196 
  
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
IFLS3 
Year: 2000 
 
All Women: 
μ: 6.551 
σ: 3.862 
 
Age <50: 
x̅: 7.527 
σ: 3.344 
  
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
IFLS4 
Year: 2007 
 
All Women: 
μ: 5.927 
σ: 3.985 
 
Age <50: 
x̅: 7.291 
σ: 3.266 
  
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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 The primary dependent variable of interest is contraceptive use. The IFLS 
asks women about their use of contraception in the past and present, as well as 
their future expectations. Survey responses about women’s current method of 
contraception from each wave are used to create three variables representing the 
types of contraception used, and general use. The survey inquires on the following 
types of contraception:  
 
1. Pill*     (22.8%) 
2. Injection (Monthly)*   (6.2%) 
3. Injection (Bi-Monthly)*   (0.5%) 
4. Injection (Quarterly)*  (47.9%) 
5. Intravaginal ring*   (0.1%) 
6. Condom    (1.8%) 
7. Intrauterine device (IUD)* (8.0%) 
8. Implant*    (3.7%) 
9. Female sterilization*  (4.6%) 
10. Male sterilization*  (0.3%) 
11. Rhythm/calendar method  (2.5%) 
12. Coitus interruptus   (1.0%) 
13. Traditional herbs   (0.4%) 
14. Traditional massage  (0.1%) 
15. Female condom   (0.1%) 
95. Other    (0.0%) 
 
The percentage of women who reported using each method in the year 
2007 is included in parentheses above. These percentages are consistent with rates 
reported by Indonesia’s Family Planning 2020 Program (Family Planning 2020, 
n.d.). Women who reported current use of any of these forms were assigned a 
value of 1 for the use of contraception variable. An additional variable for use of a 
modern form of contraception was created using the types marked with an asterisk 
(*) above. These forms are generally more effective and longer lasting. Other 
types are classified as non-modern, and captured in another variable. These 
variables are binary, with 1 representing use and 0 representing no use. Summary 
statistics for the dataset and the sample are available in Tables A1 and 1, 
respectively. Summary statistics for each wave for use of any contraception and 
use of modern contraception are reported in Tables A4 and A5. For women of all 
ages, only 32% of respondents claimed to use any form of contraception. Table 1 
below reports summary statistics for women under the age of 50. Within this 
sample, just over half of women reported using any form of contraception, at 
52%. A total of 49% of the sample reported using a modern form of 
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 contraception. The majority (54.6%) of women who reported using contraception 
use an injection as their primary form of contraception.  
 Other variables included in the dataset include urban or rural location, age, 
educational attainment, number of dependents, household size (number of 
people), household expenditure, and household expenditure per capita. Some of 
these variables are excluded from the regression because of the use of panel data 
and household fixed effects. These variables are summarized in Table 1 for 
women under the age of 50. Many variables are binary, including urban location, 
highest level of educational attainment, and the woman’s employment status.  
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Sample (Women Under the Age of 50) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Decision Sum 6,663 7.456 3.268 0 16 
Decision Sum: Decisions About Working 6,663 0.370 0.277 0 1 
Decision Sum: Decisions About Finances 6,663 2.989 1.477 0 7 
Decision Sum: Decisions About Food & Kids 6,663 2.095 1.121 0 4 
Any Decision-Making Agency 6,663 0.889 0.315 0 1 
Z-Score: Decision Sum 6,663 0.291 0.842 -1.630 2.493 
Z-Score: Decisions About Working 6,663 0.135 0.949 -1.135 2.295 
Z-Score: Decisions About Finances 6,663 0.272 0.871 -1.490 2.637 
Z-Score: Decisions About Food & Kids 6,663 0.290 0.901 -1.393 1.821 
Urban 6,663 0.418 0.493 0 1 
Age 6,663 38.766 6.574 19 49 
Advanced Degree 6,663 0.019 0.136 0 1 
High School Education 6,663 0.055 0.228 0 1 
Junior High Education 6,663 0.069 0.254 0 1 
Elementary Education 6,663 0.362 0.481 0 1 
Worked in the Past Week 6,663 0.224 0.417 0 1 
Use of Contraception 6,662 0.519 0.500 0 1 
Use of Modern Contraception 6,663 0.495 0.500 0 1 
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 Use of Nonmodern Contraception 6,663 0.024 0.153 0 1 
Number of Dependents 6,663 1.712 1.292 0 8 
Household Size (Number of People) 6,658 4.805 1.753 1 15 
Household Expenditure (in thousands of rupiah) 
6,622 1072.720 1637.98 28.94 61200 
Household Per Capita Expenditure (in thousands 
of rupiah) 6,622 243.661 365.82 6.61 10400 
ln(Household Per Capita Expenditure) 
6,622 11.919 0.945 8.80 16.153 
Community Average Per Capita Expenditure (in 
thousands of rupiah) 6,571 262.895 215.896 29.62 2253.854 
Community Average Household Expenditure (in 
thousands of rupiah) 6,571 993.250 822.581 110.18 9516.032 
Community Average Household Size 
6,571 4.320 0.738 1.909 11.000 
 
Across all three waves, an average of 89% of women in the sample had 
some decision-making agency. Approximately 42% of respondents lived in urban 
areas, and only 22% had worked outside the home in the past week. Work status 
was not found to be significant in any initial tests, and is not included in 
regressions. Elementary school was the highest level of education attained by 
36% of respondents, and only 5% had attended high school. Education variables 
are not included in the regressions because the average women did not complete 
any additional years of education during the survey period. The average age in 
this sample is 38, compared to 47 in the full dataset. The average number of 
dependents (defined as household members under the age of 15) is 1.7, with a 
range of 0 to 8 total dependents. Household size, which includes all household 
members, has an average of 4.8 people, with a range of 1 to 15 people. 
Summaries of household expenditure and expenditure per capita are also reported 
above in thousands of rupiah. The dataset also includes averages of household 
size, household expenditure, and per capita expenditure for each community.  
To further understand the impacts of contraception on decision-making 
agency, three additional variables were created to examine only certain types of 
decisions. These variables represent three categories of decisions: employment, 
finances, and food and children. The variable “Decisions About Working” 
includes only one question: whether you or your spouse work. The sum for 
“Decisions About Finances” includes seven questions: routine purchases for 
household items such as cleaning supplies, large expensive purchases for the 
household, giving money to your family, giving money to your spouse’s family, 
gifts for parties/weddings, money for monthly arisan (savings lottery), and money 
for monthly savings. The final sum variable, “Decisions About Food & Kids”, 
includes the following five questions: expenditure on food eaten at home, choice 
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 of food eaten at home, your children’s clothes, your children’s education, your 
children’s health. All three sums were then converted to z-scores in order to 
compare them to each other and to the sum of all questions.  
Additional variables that were considered but not included in the final 
dataset include access to community health centers, availability of contraception 
at these centers, access to financial services in the community, women’s age at 
their first marriage, and women’s assets at the time of their first marriage. These 
health measures were excluded because access to contraception is virtually 
universal in the dataset. Financial services, marriage age, and asset variables were 
excluded because of low response rates. 
 
Results  
Equation (1) is estimated with both OLS and fixed effects regressions. 
Estimations are available in Table 2. All eight regressions referenced in this paper 
are available in Table A2 in the Appendix. Model (1) is an OLS regression, and 
Models (2) and (3) are fixed effects regressions using the decision sum and the z-
score of decision sum. The z-score variable is used to facilitate comparison to 
Models (6), (7), and (8). 
In Model (1), available in Table 2, all variables are statistically significant 
with p-values of 0.000. Women who use contraception have an average decision-
making sum that is 0.41 points higher than women who do not use contraception. 
This represents approximately one additional decision on which women share 
decision-making agency with their spouse, compared to having no input, or 
sharing the decision with a larger group of household members. The coefficients 
for age and dependents are negative, suggesting that older women and women 
with more children have diminishing household decision-making agency. 
Household size has a positive coefficient, suggesting that women in larger 
household gain decision-making agency, which contradicts the result for 
dependents. The coefficient for the natural log of per capita expenditure is also 
significant, and suggests that women whose families have higher consumption 
expenditure have greater decision-making agency. 
In Models (2) and (3), household fixed effects and panel data are used, and 
three dependent variables remain significant: contraception, age of respondent, 
and household size. The variable representing use of contraception remains 
significant, with a coefficient of 0.976 in Model (2). This can be interpreted as 
gaining shared decision-making agency on two additional household decisions, 
because of the use of the values 0, 0.5, and 1 in constructing the decision sum. 
The coefficient for use of contraception remains positive and significant in Model 
(3). Coefficients for age of respondent and household size remain significant, and 
their signs remain constant. The results suggest that older women have less 
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 decision-making agency, and women in larger households have greater decision-
making agency. The natural log of per capita expenditure is insignificant, which is 
consistent with the introduction of fixed effects. Number of dependents also 
becomes insignificant. 
 
Table 2 
Regression Results 
 
 
(1) 
OLS Model 
(2) 
Fixed Effects  
(3) 
Fixed Effects  
Dependent Variable: 
 
Z-Score:  
Decision Sum  
  
Decision Sum  
Z-Score:  
Decision Sum  
Use of any contraceptive 0.410*** 
(0.026) 
0.976*** 
(0.129) 
0.251*** 
(0.033) 
Age of respondent -0.013*** 
(0.002) 
-0.044*** 
(0.017) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
Number of dependents -0.053*** -0.098 -0.025 
 (0.014) (0.063) (0.016) 
Household size  
(number of people) 
0.091*** 
(0.011) 
0.224*** 
(0.058) 
0.058*** 
(0.015) 
ln(household expenditure 
per capita) 
0.054*** 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.081) 
0.001 
(0.021) 
N 6617 6617 6617 
R-sq 0.12 0.095 0.095 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses 
*p < 0.1   **p < 0.05   ***p < 0.01 
Standard error is clustered by community 
 
 
These results support the hypothesis that the use of contraception increases 
women’s decision-making agency in the home. 
 
Robustness 
Some variables studied in this paper are difficult to measure, including 
decision-making agency. Use of contraception also presents challenges when 
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 ineffective methods are considered. To address these concerns, additional 
regressions are used to test whether the results are sensitive to measurement error.  
A regression using only women who use a modern form of contraception 
is estimated in Model (4). This test is based on the assumption that women who 
use modern contraception are likely to be more educated and more empowered, 
which other researchers have attributed to increased decision-making agency 
(Acharya, et. al, 2010). Modern forms are more reliable and often longer-acting. 
The results of this regression, available in Table 3, are almost identical to those in 
Model (3). The coefficient for modern contraception remains positive and 
significant, and is slightly lesser that the coefficient for use of any form of 
contraception in Model (3). This may be attributed to a large proportion of women 
using modern forms of contraception instead of older, less effective forms. 
Due to the sizeable proportion of women who reported having no 
decision-making agency, an additional regression was created using a binary 
variable that represents whether women have any level of decision-making 
agency, compared to no agency. Using a linear probability model, the coefficient 
for contraception (0.109) remains positive and significant. The regression results 
are available in Table 3, labelled as Model (5). This suggests that use of 
contraception impacts the probability that a woman makes any decisions at all, 
and increases the total number of decisions she influences. In this model, the 
variables representing age, dependents, and household size are significant.  
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 Table 3 
Robustness Regression Results 
 
 
(4) 
Fixed Effects  
(5) 
Linear Probability  
Dependent Variable: 
Z-Score:  
Decision Sum  
Probability of 
Making Any 
Decisions  
Use of any contraceptive    
0.109*** 
(0.012) 
Use of modern 
contraceptive 
0.246*** 
(0.034)   
Age of Respondent  
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Number of dependents -0.025 -0.026*** 
 (0.016) (0.005) 
Household size  
(number of people) 
0.059*** 
(0.015) 
0.036*** 
(0.005) 
ln(household expenditure 
per capita) 
0.003 
(0.021) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
N 6618 6617 
R-sq 0.087 0.128 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses 
*p < 0.1   **p < 0.05   ***p < 0.01 
Standard error is clustered by community 
   
 Table 4 below includes three additional regressions using additional 
decision sums grouped by type of decisions. Model (6) uses the variable 
“Decisions About Working”. Models (7) and (8) use “Decisions About Finances” 
and “Decisions About Food & Kids”, respectively.  
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 Table 4 
Robustness Regression Results 
 
 
(6) 
Fixed Effects  
(7) 
Fixed Effects  
(8) 
Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable: 
Z-Score: Work 
Decisions  
Z-Score:  
Financial Decisions 
Z-Score: Food & 
Children Decisions 
Use of any contraceptive  
0.104** 
(0.040) 
0.247*** 
(0.033) 
0.234*** 
(0.036) 
Age of Respondent  
0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
-0.014*** 
(0.005) 
Number of dependents  
-0.077*** 
(0.021) 
-0.035** 
(0.017) 
0.033* 
(0.018) 
Household size  
(number of people) 
0.071*** 
(0.015) 
0.058*** 
(0.015) 
0.018 
(0.016) 
ln(household expenditure 
per capita) 
-0.033 
(0.028) 
0.029 
(0.023) 
-0.035 
(0.024) 
N 6617 6617 6617 
R-sq 0.011 0.088 0.083 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses 
*p < 0.1   **p < 0.05   ***p < 0.01 
Standard error is clustered by community 
 
 
 For all three models included in Table 4, the coefficients for use of any 
contraception are positive and significant, suggesting that when women use 
contraception, they have greater decision-making agency. In particular, women’s 
decision-making related to finances, food and children are more responsive to the 
use of contraceptives. When women report using contraception, Model (6) finds 
that decision-making agency for decisions about work is 0.104 standard 
deviations higher than women who do not use contraception. Models (7) and (8) 
find even greater impacts, with use of contraception increasing decision-making 
agency for financial decisions and decisions about food and children by 0.247 and 
0.234 standard deviations, respectively. This indicates that use of contraception 
has a significantly larger impact on decisions about finances, and food and kids. 
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 Considering the value found for the sum of all sixteen types of decisions in Model 
(3) was 0.251, variation is limited. 
 While the benchmark results and the various robustness checks appear to 
strongly support the prediction that contraceptive use increases decision-making 
agency, this may not be a causal relationship. Specifically, increased decision 
making could lead to an increase in contraceptive use. To test for this, an 
instrumental variables regression should be used. This model was estimated using 
instruments that represented access to two different types of health centers, based 
on interviews with community leaders. These variables were selected to represent 
access to contraception. However, the instruments were found to be weak and 
ineffective, with an F-statistic of 2.44. This test provided a weak and biased 
estimate of use of any contraception. This may be explained by limited variation 
in the availability of health centers, as 99% of women in the sample live in a 
community that reportedly has access to both types of health centers.  
 
Conclusion & Discussion 
Empowering women through increasing women’s decision-making agency 
is crucial to promoting global economic development. Past research suggests that 
increased women’s decision-making agency improves health and education 
outcomes for children, decreases family spending on temptation goods, and 
increases income levels. The results of this study support the hypothesis that 
women who use contraception will have greater decision-making agency in the 
home and input on a greater number of household decisions. Findings suggest that 
women using contraception gain input on two additional types of household 
decisions. Therefore, governments and organizations that aim to empower women 
should consider expanding programs that improve access to contraception and 
increase contraceptive prevalence rates. These results suggest that such programs 
will not only affect fertility, but women’s decision-making agency as well. 
There are some limitations to this research, however. Though controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity were used, reverse causality cannot be completely ruled 
out. Future research should focus on finding instruments to explore this 
relationship with two-staged least squares, and should seek to include more 
variables related to women’s empowerment, such as assets owned by women 
prior to marriage, and age at first marriage. Similar studies should also be 
conducted in other countries, and with larger samples to better understand the 
impacts of contraception. Nevertheless, these results have policy implications.  
Though many initiatives exist to improve the global status of women, 
great improvements remain to be made before equality is attained. Indonesia 
should continue to invest in contraception, and ensure it is affordable and 
accessible for all people. Contraception has great potential to improve 
19
Fogarty: Contraception & Decision-Making Agency
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2018
 empowerment and decision-making agency in young women. Use of 
contraception can allow girls to pursue further education and employment 
opportunities, and delay childbirth. With further education and greater experience, 
women may demand further input on household decisions, and gain greater 
respect in their communities. Increasing access to contraception has the power to 
improve the status of women in society and create economic and health benefits 
for women and families.  
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 Appendix  
 
Table A1 
Summary Statistics for Dataset 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Decision Sum  11,042 6.326 3.880 0 16 
Decision Sum: Decisions About Working 11,042 0.331 0.292 0 1 
Decision Sum: Decisions About Finances 11,042 2.528 1.696 0 7 
Decision Sum: Decisions About Food & Kids 11,042 1.734 1.244 0 4 
Any Decision-Making Agency 11,042 0.783 0.412 0 1 
Z-Score: Decision Sum 11,042 6.6E-17 1 -1.630 2.493 
Z-Score: Decisions About Working 11,042 3.1E-17 1 -1.135 2.295 
Z-Score: Decisions About Finances 11,042 -1.3E-16 1 -1.490 2.637 
Z-Score: Decisions About Food & Kids 11,042 -2.4E-17 1 -1.393 1.821 
Urban 11,042 0.425 0.494 0 1 
Age 
11,042 47.313 12.716 19 97 
Advanced Degree 
11,042 0.016 0.125 0 1 
High School Education 
11,042 0.052 0.222 0 1 
Junior High Education 
11,042 0.069 0.253 0 1 
Elementary Education 
11,042 0.377 0.485 0 1 
Worked in the Past Week 
11,042 0.235 0.424 0 1 
Use of Contraception 
11,041 0.320 0.467 0 1 
Use of Modern Contraception 
11,042 0.305 0.461 0 1 
Use of Nonmodern Contraception 
11,042 0.015 0.122 0 1 
Number of Dependents 
11,042 1.364 1.298 0 11 
Household Size (Number of People) 
11,033 4.406 1.976 1 18 
Household Expenditure (in thousands of 
rupiah) 1,075 1762.416 25.417 85700 8.57E+07 
Household Per Capita Expenditure (in 
thousands of rupiah) 275 442.354 6.615 17100 1.71E+07 
ln(Household Per Capita Expenditure) 
10,918 12.018 0.971 8.797 16.656 
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 Community Average Per Capita Expenditure 
(in thousands of rupiah) 10,911 289.233 233.335 29.616 2253.854 
Community Average Household Expenditure 
(in thousands of rupiah) 10,911 1069.566 862.824 110.184 9516.032 
Community Average Household Size 
10,912 4.248 0.719 1.909 11 
 
 
Table A2 
Regression Outputs 
 
 
(1) 
OLS  
Model 
(2) 
Fixed 
Effects  
(3) 
Fixed 
Effects  
(4) 
Fixed 
Effects  
(5) 
Linear 
Probability  
(6) 
Fixed 
Effects  
(7) 
Fixed 
Effects  
(8) 
Fixed  
Effects 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Z-Score: 
Decision 
Sum  
  
Decision 
Sum  
Z-Score: 
Decision 
Sum  
Z-Score:  
Decision 
Sum  
Probability of 
Making Any 
Decisions  
Z-Score: 
Work 
Decisions  
Z-Score:  
Financial 
Decisions 
 
Z-Score: Food 
& Children 
Decisions 
 
Use of any 
contraceptive 
0.410*** 
(0.026) 
0.976*** 
(0.129) 
0.251*** 
(0.033)  
0.109*** 
(0.012) 
0.104** 
(0.040) 
0.247*** 
(0.033) 
0.234*** 
(0.036) 
Use of modern 
contraceptive  
  0.246*** 
(0.034)  
   
Age of  
Respondent 
-0.013*** 
(0.002) 
-0.044*** 
(0.017) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
-0.014*** 
(0.005) 
Number of 
dependents 
-0.053*** 
(0.014) 
-0.098 
(0.063) 
-0.025 
(0.016) 
-0.025 
(0.016) 
-0.026*** 
(0.005) 
-0.077*** 
(0.021) 
-0.035** 
(0.017) 
0.033* 
(0.018) 
Household size  
(number of people) 
0.091*** 
(0.011) 
0.224*** 
(0.058) 
0.058*** 
(0.015) 
0.059*** 
(0.015) 
0.036*** 
(0.005) 
0.071*** 
(0.015) 
0.058*** 
(0.015) 
0.018 
(0.016) 
ln(household 
expenditure per 
capita) 
0.054*** 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.081) 
0.001 
(0.021) 
0.003 
(0.021) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.033 
(0.028) 
0.029 
(0.023) 
 
-0.035 
(0.024) 
N 6617 6617 6617 6618 6617 6617 6617 
 
6617 
R-sq 0.12 0.095 0.095 0.087 0.128 0.011 0.088 0.083 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses 
*p < 0.1   **p < 0.05   ***p < 0.01 
Standard error is clustered by community 
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 Table A3 
Summary Statistics for Decision-Making Agency 
 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Year 1997 3985 6.443 3.784 0 16 
Year 2000 3768 6.551 3.862 0 16 
Year 2007 3289 5.927 3.985 0 16 
Year 1997, Age <50 2663 7.490 3.196 0 15.5 
Year 2000, Age <50 2408 7.527 3.344 0 16 
Year 2007, Age <50 1592 7.291 3.266 0 16 
 
 
 
Table A4 
Summary Statistics for Use of Any Contraception 
 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Year 1997 3984 0.361 0.480 0 1 
Year 2000 3768 0.350 0.477 0 1 
Year 2007 3289 0.237 0.426 0 1 
Year 1997, Age <50 2662 0.529 0.499 0 1 
Year 2000, Age <50 2408 0.527 0.499 0 1 
Year 2007, Age <50 1592 0.491 0.500 0 1 
 
 
 
Table A5 
Summary Statistics for Use of Modern Contraception 
 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Year 1997 3985 0.347 0.476 0 1 
Year 2000 3768 0.334 0.472 0 1 
Year 2007 3289 0.221 0.415 0 1 
Year 1997, Age <50 2663 0.510 0.500 0 1 
Year 2000, Age <50 2408 0.502 0.500 0 1 
Year 2007, Age <50 1592 0.457 0.498 0 1 
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